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The governments of the United States, Mexico, and Canada reached
consensus on the long-awaited and often controversial North American Free
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Trade Agreement (NAFTA or the Agreement) on August 12, 1992.' In Mexico,
President Salinas executed the Agreement on December 17, 1992, which was
subsequently ratified by the Mexican Senate on November 22, 1993. In Canada,
the Agreement was ratified by the Senate on June 23, 1993. Supplemental
Accords were negotiated and signed by each of the three parties to the
Agreement on September 14, 1993. Although liberal President Jean Chretien
subsequently called for a renegotiation of NAFTA, Canada did not renege on its
commitment. In the United States, the Clinton Administration did not begin to
mobilize its forces behind NAFTA until after the signing of the Supplemental
Accords. Efforts included a panel of three former U.S. Presidents at a White
House press conference to demonstrate their support for the pact, a televised
debate between Vice President Al Gore and leading antagonist Ross Perot, and
intensive lobbying efforts by President Clinton. The U.S. House of Representa-
tives and Senate approved the Agreement in mid-November 1993. As a result,
the Agreement took effect on January 1, 1994, surprisingly on schedule. The
text of the Agreement and its associated schedules, comprising more than 2,000
pages, was made public in early September 1992.
The Agreement establishes a "free trade" area between the three signatory
countries, affecting everything from textiles to oil field equipment and addressing
the entire range of trade issues from tariffs to procurement procedures. Its
primary objectives are to break down barriers to trade through the elimination
of tariffs on goods originating within the boundaries of the free trade area, to
promote fair competition, and to increase investment opportunities across the
signatories' borders. These goals are to be achieved through the principles of
"national treatment, most-favored nation treatment and procedural 'transparen-
cy. '2
This article reviews the potential impact of NAFTA on U.S.-based
companies pursuing new opportunities in the Mexican energy sector, focusing
primarily on the petroleum industry.3 The first section reviews the geographical
and sociopolitical setting by describing known Mexican resources, existing
operations, the domestic market for energy, and the historical role of the
Mexican state monopoly in Mexico's energy industry. The second section
provides a sector-by-sector analysis of the new opportunities for U.S.-based
companies that will be created by NAFTA. The third section focuses on some
of the special problems that remain in the fields of labor and the environment,
and the statutory and regulatory regime that U.S. domestic companies will face
when participating in the Mexican petroleum sector. The concluding section
provides some final advice to interested potential U.S. investors in the Mexico
petroleum sector.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter
NAFrA].
2. The Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America,
Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement 1 (Aug. 12, 1992).
3. This paper does not examine the effect of NAFTA on the mining sector, given the limited application
of the Agreement to that area, or on the electricity sector, which is a complete subject unto itself.
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H1. BACKGROUND: SURVEY OF MEXICAN PETROLEUM SECTOR
A. Mexican Energy Resources
NAFIA raises expectations among American companies in the energy
sector because of the wealth of Mexican oil and gas resources. Most of these
expectations are well founded.
1. Crude Oil Reserves and Production
Mexico has the eighth largest oil reserves in the world. According to one
source, Mexico's proved reserves stand at 51.3 billion barrels.4 The state energy
monopoly, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), estimates that it could maintain
current production rates for another fifty years. Mexico's chief oil-producing
regions are the offshore fields in the Gulf of Campeche and the onshore fields
in Villahermosa and Poza Rica.'
While some oil analysts have accused PEMEX of inflating its proved
reserve figures, substantial oil reserves are continually being discovered. Indeed,
PEMEX believes that recent finds in the state of Chiapas and the Bay of
Campeche will increase Mexico's reserves to as much as 92 billion barrels. But
exploiting these finds will require increased foreign investment and expertise.
In addition, some of the fields appear to be below 16,500 feet, which exceeds the
reach of PEMEX's current technology.
6
PEMEX currently produces 2.67 million barrels per day (bid)7, of which
1.4 million barrels are exported, half of it to the U.S.8 As Mexico's economy
grows, domestic energy needs can be expected to claim an even larger share of
output, reducing the supplies available for export. Unless production increases
dramatically, Mexico may even become a net oil importer by the turn of the
4. Worldwide Production Report, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 7, 1993, at 45.
5. U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., GAO/NSIAD-92-169, MEXICAN OIL: IssuEs AFFECTING POTENTIAL U.S.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 9 (1992) [hereinafter MEXICAN OIL]. PEMEX allocates its oil production activities
among three regional divisions based in Ciudad Carmen, Poza Rica, and Villahermosa. The first two account
for the greater part of production and reserves. The Ciudad Carmen division oversees offshore operations in
the Bay of Campeche, where 1.75 million barrels of oil are produced daily frori 10 fields. This is approxi-
mately 70% of Mexico's total oil output. A second division based in Poza Rica, Veracruz covers the northern
onshore region. Although the nearby Chicontepec field is the second largest after Campeche, individual well
output is low - 50 to a 100 b/d, compared with over 10,000 per day from offshore wells - due to high clay
and water content in the strata. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NOIzTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE:
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 189-90 (1992) [hereinafter HUFBAUER & SCHOTT (1992)].
6. Hufbauer & Schott (1992), supra note 5, at 191 n.5, citing J. CoM. June 17, 1991, at 6B.
7. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/T-GGD-92-24, MEXICAN OIL: MEXICAN POLICIES AFFECT U.S. TRADE
AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNrrms 3 (1992) (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director, International Trade
and Finance Issues, General Government Division) [hereinafter Mendelowitz Testimony (1992)]. PEMEX's
oil production peaked in 1982 at about 2.7 million bid. Production declined until 1986 and remained at an
average of approximately 2.5 million b/d through 1991. Oil exports remained constant as well, averaging about
1.3 million barrels per day from 1986 through 1991. Id.
8. Louis Uchitelle, Pemex: Mexico's Hesitant Oil Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at Dl, D6.
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century.9 Growing energy demands and significant environmental concerns will
also require Mexico to increase its production of natural gas and to alter its
demand mix so that a greater share of domestic consumption can be met by
natural gas and electricity. By using more natural gas to meet domestic energy
needs, Mexico will free up more oil for export, which will yield revenues that
can be used in part to service Mexico's large external debt."
2. Natural Gas Reserves and Production
Although Mexico is the world's sixth largest producer of natural gas, its
proved reserves have been steadily declining in recent years. Peaking in 1983
at around 77 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), Mexico's proved gas reserves fell to 72.7
Tcf by 1989." This 9.4% decline has been attributed to Mexico's lack of
capital for exploration and development as well as to the overall inefficiency of
the PEMEX monopoly. 2 Gas production has followed a similar trend,
climbing to 4.25 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 1982 and then falling to
3.43 Bcf/d in 1986. This decline stabilized during the later half of the 1980s.' 3
In 1991, natural gas production was 3.63 Bcd, a decrease of 0.5% from 3.65
Bcf/d in 1990.'4
Gas production remains low largely because eighty-five to ninety percent
of Mexico's gas is associated gas. The level of associated gas depends on oil
output, which in turn depends on efficient maintenance of the reservoir and
PEMEX's policy of restricting oil exports. The situation has worsened with
PEMEX's emphasis on off-shore exploration, where gas-oil ratios are generally
lower. 1
While Mexico consumes a significant amount of natural gas, expansion of
the market has been limited. Most economically recoverable gas reserves are
situated in southern Mexico,' 6 far from the country's industrial centers.
PEMEX has responded by constructing a gas pipeline system which, by the end
of 1989, consisted of 101 pipelines covering 13,166 kilometers. Pipeline
expansion continues, but at a slow pace. 7 Development of Mexico's natural
gas reserves, however, may speed up as a result of a recent agreement between
state-owned Gaz de France (GDF) and PEMEX to cooperate in long-term
strategies in all areas of natural gas development. These areas include transport,
9. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT (1992), supra note 5, at 185.
10. The Mexican national debt is approximated at $97.4 billion. JOSEPH P. RIVA, JR., EXPLORATION
OPPORTUNITIES IN LATIN AMERICA 40-41 (1992).
11. Gary B. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions Between the United States and Mexico: Political and Legal
Impediments to Free Trade, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J., 577, 614 (1992), [hereinafter Conine, Natural Gas
Transactions].
12. Id. at 614; HUFBAUER & SCHOTT (1992), supra note 5, at 200.
13. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 614-15.
14. Mexico - Oil and Gas Field Equipment, MARKET REP. at 2 (Feb. 16, 1993).
15. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 615.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 616.
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stocking, distribution, marketing, tariff policies, gas utilization, and personnel.'
The Mexican government projects that national demand for energy will
grow between 4.6% and 5.2% through 1994.'9 An expanding petrochemical
industry and greater emphasis on environmental protection is expected to sustain
this demand. Under the c-tent five-year plan, existing supplies of natural gas
will be directed towards priority uses. These include use as an industrial
feedstock and as a means for reducing pollution in critical areas.20
Mexico is currently a net importer of natural gas, even though it had
previously exported as much as 100 billion cubic feet per year.2' At present,
the United States supplies nearly ninety percent of Mexico's imported gas. Most
of this gas is consumed by the border cities of Juarez, Mexicali, and Tijuana, but
some of it is also directed to Mexico City in an attempt to curb the city's air
pollution. PEMEX has announced that it will continue to increase natural gas
imports to meet short-term domestic needs.22 Growing demand from Mexican
industry, especially for petrochemical and independent power production, can be
expected to promote increasing Mexican imports of natural gas from the United
States, at least during the short term.23
3. Refining and Distribution Facilities
Mexico currently has seven refineries in operation with a combined capacity
of 1.524 million b/d.24 The fifty-eight year-old Azcapotzalco refinery in
Mexico City, which had produced an average 105,000 b/d, was closed in March
1991.' The aging refinery had handled about four percent of domestic
production, but was responsible for as much as fifteen percent of Mexico's
18. GDF Signs Deal With Pemex Gas, PLATr's DiLGRAM NEWS, May 19, 1%93, al 1.
19. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 617. Mexico's existing consumption of gas falls
into three categories. PEMEX's primary production operations consume about one-third of the gas it produces
or imports. PEMEX's petrochemical and gas operations consume another third. The final third goes to the
domestic market, with four-fifths of this going to industrial users and the remainder to commercial and
residential customers. Id. at 616.
20. Id. at 617.
21. NAFTA Approved by Canadian House of Commons; Congressional Research Service Report Sees
"Limited" Impact of NAFTA on U.S. Gas Producers, FosTER NAT. GAS REp., June 3, 1993, at 21 [hereinafter
NAFTA-Canadian House of Commons]. Although Mexico once exported gas to the United States, shipments
ceased in 1984 when parties to the Border Gas Transaction were unable to agree on a price redetermination.
Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, sopra note 11, at 612.
22. HUFBAUER & SCHolrr (1992), supra note 5, at 200-01.
23. From the U.S. perspective, its gas exports to Mexico will probably be offset by greater U.S. gas
imports from Canada. A report by the Congressional Research Service projects that the United States will triple
its net gas imports between 1990 and 2010. The report predicts that 15 years from now, Mexico will again
become a net exporter of natural gas to the United States, with net exports reaching 110 billion cubic feet in
2010. NAFTA-Canadian House of Commons, supra note 21.
24. Laura Bell, ed., Worldwide Refining, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 49. (Figures are current as of
Jan. 1, 1994.) The largest of these is the Salina Cruz refinery, with a capacity of 330,000 b/d. Id. at 76-77.
Mexico's other refineries are located at Tula, Hidalgo (320,000 b/d), Cadereyta (235,000 b/d), Salamanca
(235,000 b/d), Minatitlan (200,000 bId), Ciudad Madero (195,000 b/d), and Reynosa (9,000 b/d). Id.
25. Pemex Charts Future at a Critical Crossroads, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WKLY., Apr. 1, 1991, at
8 [hereinafter Pemex Charts Future].
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industrial air pollution.26 A smaller refinery in Poza Rica (with a 50,000 b/d
crude capacity) has also been shut down."
Despite its wealth of oil reserves, Mexico's shortage of refining capacity has
turned the country into a net importer of gasoline. Of Mexico's 106,000 b/d of
imported products,28 Mexico imports 50,000 to 100,000 gallons of gasoline per
day to close the gap between its refining capacity and growing domestic
demand.29 Following the shutdown of the Azcapotzalco refinery, gasoline
imports jumped from 30,605 b/d in 1990 to 68,889 b/d in 1991.30 PEMEX
refineries are currently operating at capacity,3' and PEMEX officials expect no
new capacity to be available until 1996 at the earliest.
32
PEMEX plans to make significant investments to increase refining capacity.
PEMEX capital spending for 1993 is set at $2.93 billion (a reduction of $120
million from 1992), with twenty-eight percent targeted for refining and
marketing.33 PEMEX plans to replace the Azcapotzalco refinery with a new
plant that will have a processing capacity of 300,000 bid. 34 PEMEX is also
currently in the process of adding 150,000 b/d capacity to its Salina Cruz
refinery, upgrading its Tula refinery,35 and planning to increase the capacity of
its Madero refinery.36 The uprising in Chiapas and the assassination of PRI
candidate Luis Doraldo Colosio, however, may lead to a postponment of PEMEX
plans at best until after scheduled elections.
Contributing to PEMEX's need to boost refining capacity is Mexico's
growing demand for unleaded gasoline. During the first quarter of 1993,
unleaded gasoline sales totalled 141,500 b/d, almost double the sales for the
same period of 1992.37 While unleaded gasoline accounted for just eight
percent of total sales in 1991, it is expected to reach forty percent in 1994 as a
result of environmental concerns.38 As discussed below, PEMEX has already
begun joining with some foreign companies to increase its refining capacity.
PEMEX's recently announced joint venture with Shell Oil Company to acquire
fifty percent ownership in a U.S. Shell refinery will help Mexico meet its
growing internal demand for unleaded gasoline.
26. HUFBAUER & SCHo'r (1992), supra note 5, at 193.
27. Bell, supra note 24, at 52.
28. High Mexican Prices Take Bite Out of Local Demand, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WKLY, Dec. 7,
1992, at 5.
29. Wesley R. Smith, Liberalizing the Mexican Oil Industry, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Dec. 1992, at 6.
30. Jane Baird, Mexico's Oil Revolution, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 6, 1992, at BI.
31. Mexico Gives Pemex Taxes to Match New Corporate Face, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WKLY, Nov.
16, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Taxes].
32. Pemex Reshuffles its Parts to Make Stronger Whole, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WKLY, Feb. 15, 1993,
at 4 [hereinafter Pemex Reshuffles Parts].
33. Taxes, supra note 31, at 2.
34. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr (1992), supra note 5, at 193.
35. Laura Bell, ed., Refineries - Worldwide Construction, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 65.
36. Invitation to Register: Revamping the Madero Refinery, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Nov. 1992, at 10.
37. Pemex Gasoline Sales Rise, THE OIL DAILY, May 20, 1993, at 5.




Mexico's petrochemical industry is the fifteenth largest in the world and
accounts for just over three percent of the world's production.39 Mexico has
approximately 700 petrochemical plants that produce 585 different products.'
The country's major petrochemical complexes are located at Pajarito, Morelos,
Cangrejaera, and Cosoleacaque, which together produce roughly ninety percent
of the country's petrochemicals.4 Ammonia and ethylene plants account for
twenty-two percent of total output 4 2 The industry is dominated by PEMEX,
which operates all of Mexico's basic petrochemical plants43 and sixty secondary
petrochemical plants.44
Petrochemicals constitute a major and growing industry in Mexico.
Petrochemicals accounted for 2.5% of Mexican GNP in 1989,"5 and increased
utilization of production capacity led to nearly nine percent annual growth
between 1985 and 1991.' In 1990, Mexico had 20.1 million tons per year of
installed capacity, and petrochemical plant utilization reached 90.3%. 4' The
industry produced 17.5 million tons and generated $1.3 billion in sales in 1990,
accounting for 12.5% of PEMEX's total revenues for that year.48
Despite its significant petrochemical industry, Mexico remains a net
importer of basic petrochemicals. In 1991, Mexico imported $31 million in basic
petrochemicals from the United States, while it exported only $4 million to its
northern neighbor.49 Mexico spent about $5.5 billion to import basic petro-
chemicals between 1980 and 1988.50
Mexican demand for petrochemicals can be expected to increase in tandem
with national economic development. Without increased foreign investment in
local production capacity, however, growing needs will have to be met through
increased imports." The Mexican government has estimated that the petro-
39. Pemex: Structure, Petrochemicals Production, International Activities, MEX. TRADE & L. REP., Jan.
1992, at 25 [hereinafter Pemex].
40. U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., GAO INSIAD-91-212, U.S.-MExICo ENERGY: THE U.S. REACTION TO RECENT
REFORMS IN MEXICO'S PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY 7 (1991) [hereinafter U.S.-MExIco ENERGY].
41. Pemex Reshuffles Parts, supra note 32, at 3.
42. Id.
43. See U.S.-MExico ENERGY, supra note 40, at 1 for an explanation of the term "basic petrochemicals."
See also discussion infra part III.D.
44. OGJ Newsletter, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 22, 1993, at 4. PEMEX plans to shut down three or four of
these plants as part of the restructuring of its petrochemical operations. Id.
45. HUFBAUER & SCHOTr (1992), supra note 5, at 193.
46. Pemex Charts Future, supra note 25, at 9.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Pub. No. 2596, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED
INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREEMENT 19-1, table 19-1 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N].
50. U.S.-MEXiCO ENERGY, supra note 40, at 3.
51. HUFBAUER & SCHoTr (1992), supra note 5, at 197.
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chemical industry will need $5 to $10 billion in investment by 1995, or Mexico
will continue to face significant trade deficits in basic petrochemicals.5 2
B. Unique Role of PEMEX in Mexican Energy Sector
To understand the operation of the oil and gas industry in Mexico, one must
first understand Mexico's unique constitutional provisions and the dominant role
exercised by PEMEX. By law, Mexico reserves to the State all rights over
exploration, development, refining, transportation, storage, distribution and "first
hand sales" of oil, natural gas, and their primary products. The state entity in
which these rights are vested is PEMEX. 3
1. Historical Factors Behind the Formation of Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX)
The current regime of state ownership of petroleum is actually a relatively
recent phenomenon. A quite different system of private ownership for oil and
gas reserves was established in Mexico by the Mining Law of 1884 .'
Subsequent discovery of commercial oil reserves in 1901 led to a huge influx of
foreign investment for petroleum development. By the 1930s these operations
were mostly controlled by major foreign companies, such as Royal Dutch/Shell,
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Sinclair, Cities Service, and Gulf Oil. Foreign
companies at that time were producing ninety-five percent of Mexico's crude
oil.15
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 reversed existing Mexican laws on
mineral ownership. Article 27 of the new Constitution specifically reserved
ownership of valuable minerals, including petroleum, to the state: "In the nation
is vested legal ownership ... of all minerals or substances which in veins,
layers, masses or beds constitute deposits whose nature is different from the
components of the land,... [including] petroleum and all hydrocarbons-solid,
liquid or gaseous." 6
The new Petroleum Law of 1925 implemented these constitutional
principles. In particular, the law required special government confirmation of oil
production rights granted prior to 1917. Attempts to enforce the law predictably
escalated tensions between foreign oil companies and the Mexican govern-
ment. 7
52. U.S.-MEXIco ENERGY, supra note 40, at 2.
53. See Gary B. Conine, Mexico: Energy Development and the State Oil Company, 27 TLsA L.J. 625,
628 n.10 (1992) [hereinafter Conine, Mexico].
54. Id. at 627 n.2
55. Id. at 626. The largest Mexican oil company at that time, Mexican Eagle Oil Company, had been
acquired by Royal Dutch/Shell. Id.
56. Id. at 628 n.9.
57. Id. at 628-29; See also MERRILL RiPPY, OIL AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION 29 (1972).
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Relations with oil companies deteriorated still further in the mid-1930s as
a result of increasing unrest among Mexican petroleum workers. Following a
year of unsuccessful negotiations for a new contract with the petroleum workers
union, and a ten-day general strike, the Mexican Federal Board of Mediation and
Arbitration ordered the foreign oil companies to provide wage increases, pension
and medical plans, sick leave policies, and vacation pay. Although this order
was affirmed by the Mexican Supreme Court, major foreign oil producers
refused to comply. In response, Mexican President Cardenas issued an
expropriation decree on March 18, 1938. The decree eliminated foreign
ownership and gave the state exclusive control over Mexican natural resourc-
es.
58
PEMEX was created in June 1938 to take over the assets expropriated from
foreign ownership. In addition, all government agencies involved with the
petroleum industry were dissolved and their functions assumed by PEMEX. As
a result, PEMEX gained broad control over exploration, development, refining,
transportation, storage, distribution, and "first hand sales" of oil, natural gas, and
their products.59
PEMEX was formed as a public institution owned jointly by the federal
government and the petroleum workers union. In theory, PEMEX enjoyed
autonomy from government control with the ability to conduct commercial
activities like any private enterprise. In practice, PEMEX was subject to a
number of political and economic constraints that distinguished it from most
private enterprises.' For instance, management of PEMEX was vested in an
eleven-member board with six of its board members appointed by the President
of Mexico and the remainder by the petroleum workers union. Daily operations
were directed by the Director General and seven subdirectors, all of whom were
appointed by the President.6"
2. Difficulties Faced by PEMEX
As a quasi-public organization, PEMEX had obligations far beyond those
of most profit-making enterprises. These included concerns over national
employment, income distribution, and regional equity. Because of the close
interrelationships between PEMEX management and government officials,
PEMEX decisions were often guided by political considerations. These factors
led to a series of policies that diminished the capital available for reinvestment.
First, PEMEX was subjected to high taxes as a means of raising government
revenue. The company was viewed in part as a source of revenues for social
welfare programs. During the 1980s in particular, PEMEX profits funded debt
payments to foreign creditors and paid for Mexican domestic programs. PEMEX
revenues made up almost half of all government revenues, 62 and the company
58. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 586; Conine, Mexico, supra note 53, at 627-29.
59. Conine, Mexico, supra note 53, at 630 nn. 22, 23.
60. Id. at 629.
61. Id. at 630-31.
62. Baird, supra note 30.
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was used as a source of ready employment.63 Second, a substantial share of the
company's revenues was spent on de facto price subsidies to provide low prices
on petroleum products in an attempt to spur domestic economic development.
Third, PEMEX was inefficient because decision-making was afflicted by an over-
centralized management system, which lacked incentives to promote efficiency.
This can be partly attributed to a lack of competition and to the influence of the
petroleum workers union. Finally, existing inefficiencies were heightened by the
constant frictions of PEMEX's political, social, and profit-maximizing
agendas.64
Due to rising world oil prices during the 1970s and the discovery of new
oil reserves in southern Mexico, the potentially destructive effects of these
policies largely went unrealized during those years. 65  But the depletion of
profits and the lack of reinvestment by PEMEX in its own infrastructure from
1982 onwards led to a predictable decline in production and revenues. Mexico
did not replace its oil and gas reserves for most of the 1980s.' By the end of
the decade, its failure to accumulate internal funds because of high taxes and
social obligations placed PEMEX in dire need of investment for oil and gas
exploration and production.67
As a result of inefficiencies and PEMEX's shortage of funds, exploration
equipment and pipeline systems have become antiquated. An average well in
Mexico, about 12,000 feet deep, takes as long as fifteen weeks to drill (nearly
five times as long as a similar well would take to drill in the United States).
During 1991, Mexico had an average of 109 rigs working, which drilled 141
63. A U.S. Embassy official in Mexico City points out that three years ago the Venezuelan oil industry
had approximately one-quarter the number of employees as PEMEX to produce similar amounts of oil. An
identical point is made by Baird, supra note 30. Among some Mexicans, PEMEX was knovn as a "petroleum
cow" for its plentitude of jobs for friends and relatives. Id.
64. For a comprehensive discussion of these policies and the problems they have created, see Conine,
Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 592.
65. See MEXICAN OIL, supra note 5, at 3, 14.
66. Allan Mendelowitz testifying before a congressional subcommittee in April 1991, painted a dismal
picture of the severe problems PEMEX was facing from its sharply reduced investment since 1982:
As a result, Mexico is confronting continuing shortages in both investment funds and feedstock
supplies for its petrochemical industry. An adequate future supply of Mexican natural gas, the
primary raw material for the petrochemical industry, is in jeopardy because of the lack of investment.
Since 1982, Mexican production of natural gas has been slowly declining. The major reason for this
decline has been the lack of financial resources for natural gas exploration and development ....
A number of petrochemical projects that the Mexican government began in the early 1980s are
incomplete, due to insufficient investment funds. PEMEX is short approximately $1.7 billion
required to complete 21 investment projects planned a decade ago to meet Mexico's demand for
petrochemicals .... The Mexican trade deficit in basic petrochemicals is expected to grow because
of insufficient investment in feedstock plant capacity.
U.S. GEN. AcCr. OFF., GAO/T-NSIAD-91-22, REFORMS IN THE MEXICAN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY HAVE
NOT INCREASED U.S. INVESTMENT (statement of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Director, Int'l Trade, Energy, and Fin.
Issues, Nat'l Security, and Int'l Aff. Div.), 1-3 (1991) [hereinafter Mendelowitz Testimony (1991)].
67. See MEXICAN OIL, supra note 5, at 3, 14.
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wells. In the United States, an average of 860 rigs drilled 30,000 wells in the
same period of time.68
According to PEMEX Finance Director Ernesto Marcos, PEMEX also
under-invested in its refineries during the 1980s, particularly with respect to
maintenance. 69 Insufficient maintenance, aging refineries, poor transportation
infrastructure, and inefficient management and labor all have slowed production
of gasoline by PEMEX.7°
Lack of reinvestment has also increased environmental and safety hazards.
A climax was reached when a leaky PEMEX pipeline caused an explosion in
Guadalajara in April 1992, killing over 190 people.7' In other instances, public
inspections of PEMEX-owned gasoline service stations in the vicinity of Mexico
City led to the closure of one-quarter of them in May 1992.72 As noted earlier,
the Azcapotzalco refinery, the leading industrial polluter in Mexico City, also
was shut down.
3. Restructuring of PEMEX
73
PEMEX began a long-term reduction in its labor force shortly after the
election of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988. Over the past three
years, the number of PEMEX employees has been reduced from 219,000 to
125,000. 71 Salinas took a number of other steps to place economic pressure on
PEMEX, opening Mexico to petrochemical imports and bringing in a small
number of foreign contractors like Triton International to drill in the Bay of
Campeche. 5
In 1992, in the aftermath of the Guadalajara tragedy, further steps were
taken to restructure PEMEX. President Salinas seized the opportunity to dismiss
several PEMEX directors and to propose a complete overhauling. Because a
decision to privatize PEMEX, or to open it up to foreign investment, would
undoubtedly have been politically inexpedient, Salinas announced in June that
the company would be made more efficient by dividing it up into its constituent
parts: a central holding company and four autonomous subsidiaries. 76 The goal
68. Dale Jones, Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North American Free
Trade Agreement 8 (written testimony presented to the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Nov. 25, 1992). Mr. Jones
is Chairman, Petroleum Equipment and Suppliers Ass'n.
69. Damian Fraser, Mexican Oil Giant to Invest $4 Billion, FIN. TIMEs, June 13, 1991, at 30.
70. HtFBAUER & SCHOTT (1992), supra note 5, at 190.
71. Gray Newman, Guadalajara Blast Ignites Scrutiny of All Companies, 1992 Bus. LATIN AM. 137.
72. Green Watch, 1992 Bus. LATIN AM. 180.
73. A number of articles by American commentators suggest ways for restructuring PEMEX. See, e.g.,
Conine, Mexico, supra note 53, at 636-45; Wesley R. Smith, Oil and Prosperity: Reforming Mexico's
Petroleum Monopoly, MEX. TRADE & LAW REP., Nov. 1992, at 5 [hereinafter Smith, Oil and Prosperity]; and
Wesley R. Smith, Liberalizing the Mexican Oil Industry, MEX. TRADE & LAW REP., Dec. 1992, at 5
[hereinafter Smith, Mexican Oil Industry].
74. The author owes this point to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. A large number of
dismissed PEMEX workers were "eventuales" on continually-renewed temporary contracts who are now
demanding severance pay from PEMEX. See Baird, supra note 30.
75. Id.
76. Smith, Mexican Oil Industry, supra note 73, at 7; Management Alert, 1992 BUS. LATIN AM. 168.
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of each new subsidiary is to become self-sufficient. In particular, the new
petroleum exploration and production subsidiary will no longer be able to use the
profits of other PEMEX operations to finance its own losses.
The Mexican Congress approved this restructuring of PEMEX in July
1992." As a result, PEMEX is now being converted into a new holding
company, Petroleos Mexicanos Corporativo, which will remain responsible for
overall strategic planning and finance, and four subsidiaries: PEMEX Exploration
and Production, PEMEX Refining, PEMEX Gas and Basic Petrochemicals, and
PEMEX Secondary Petrochemicals. The Director General of the holding
company will preside over the management board of each of the subsidiaries.
A separate Director General has already been appointed for each of the
subsidiaries. To emphasize the seriousness of the reorganization, the government
has announced that headquarters of PEMEX Exploration and Production is to be
moved to Campeche, and that the headquarters of PEMEX Secondary Petro-
chemicals is to be moved to Veracruz, although these steps have encountered
some resistance among PEMEX officials.78
A key issue remains the ability of the new PEMEX to raise the $20 billion
needed to execute its five-year reinvestment plan. While oil production is
PEMEX's top investment priority, there is also a need to construct new
refineries, gasoline stations, and petrochemical plants. PEMEX is unlikely to be
able to raise sufficient capital through its own profits, government help, or even
through borrowing on capital markets.79 Although PEMEX has thus far been
reluctant to adopt this course, many experts believe the most likely means for
raising sufficient capital would be to open PEMEX to foreign investment.
The restructuring of PEMEX thus may open up significant new opportuni-
ties for foreign investors in the very near future. With the adoption of NAFTA,
American investors will be in an excellent position to take advantage of new
opportunities as they arise. In some respects, the restructuring of PEMEX, in
combination with the improved investment climate created by NAFTA, may be
the most important aspect of the Agreement for the U.S. petroleum industry.
77. Management Alert, 1992 BuS. LATtN AM. 248.
78. The author owes these observations to officials at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.
79. In 1992, PEMEX took on more than $800 million in new debt, driving the monopoly's total foreign
indebtedness to $7.2 billion. Capital has also been generated through a Citibank trust which has sold $300
million in bonds. Some financing for new PEMEX projects will also come from a $790 million loan from the
Japanese government aimed at ameliorating air pollution in Mexico City. PEMEX will receive $775 million
for investment in refineries to produce unleaded gasoline, gasoline additives, and to reduce the sulfur content
in diesel fuels. See Pemex, supra note 39, at 27. The Export-Import Bank of Japan is also expected to lend




III. SECTOR-BY-SECTOR ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NAFTA
In this next section, we will explore the main areas of the oil and gas
industry in which NAFIA is expected to open up opportunities in Mexico for
U.S.-based companies.'o At the outset, we must note that NAFTA is disap-
pointingly narrow in its application to the exploration and production sector since
it preserves intact Mexico's monopoly on its oil and gas resources. Ultimately,
U.S. negotiators felt that Mexican negotiators would be unable to bargain over
these provisions, based on their historical and cultural importance in Mexico.
The U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. negotiating team therefore focused
on ways of opening the Mexican energy sector to American investors and
contractors, rather than attempting to alter Mexico's constitutional prohibition on
foreign ownership of oil and natural gas. As a result, the most profound effects
of the Agreement on the petroleum industry will probably be experienced in the
petroleum service sector and the petrochemical industry.
Natural gas producers are permitted by NAFTA to engage in direct
negotiations between producers and end users of natural gas, without having to
go through PEMEX as an intermediary. The downstream-side (refining and
marketing) of the industry will experience no noticeable effect on the rights of
the Mexican government to regulate investment in refineries and marketing and
distribution chains.
In the petrochemical sector, the Agreement provides that fifty percent more
basic petrochemicals in Mexico will become available to investors from the
United States and Canada. Finally, NAFTA will significantly open up the
government procurement process (inclusive of PEMEX) for the provision of
services and supplies to the upstream, downstream, and petrochemical sectors,
and reduce the tariff levels associated with equipment supplied under these
contracts. The remainder of this section will analyze the impact of the
Agreement on individual sectors of the oil and gas industry in greater detail.
A. Exploration and Production
While there was early hope that this portion of the energy sector would be
opened up through NAFTA, the Agreement merely reaffirms Mexico's
constitutional monopoly on the exploration, development, transportation and
"first hand sales" of crude oil and natural gas. Article 601(1) of NAFTA
80. The principal NAFTA Chapter affecting the U.S. energy sector is Chapter 6, "Energy and Basic
Petrochemicals." Additional chapters that create opportunities for the U.S. energy industry, either for
investment or for operation in Mexico, include the chapters on investment (Chapter 11), government
procurement (Chapter 10), standards-related measures (Chapter 9), and competition, monopolies, and state
enterprises (Chapter 15). NAFTA, supra note I.
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provides that "the parties confirm their full respect for their constitutions."'"
Annex 602.3 provides that:
1. The Mexican State reserves to itself the following strategic activities and
investment in such activities: (a) exploration and exploitation of crude oil and
natural gas; refining or processing of crude oil and natural gas; and production of
artificial gas, basic petrochemicals and their feedstocks; and pipelines; and
(b) foreign trade; transportation, storage and distribution, up to and including first
hand sales of the following goods: crude oil; natural and artificial gas; goods
covered by this Chapter obtained from the refining or processing of crude oil and
natural gas; and basic petrochemicals.82
Despite these limitations, the Preamble to the Energy Chapter of NAFTA
provides some ray of hope that risk-sharing agreements might be on the horizon.
The Preamble states that one of the Agreement's fundamental principles is the
"sustained and gradual liberalization "of "trade in energy and basic petrochemi-
cal goods."83 In the long run, these may well be the principles on which future
profit-sharing ventures will be predicated.
Although the upstream sector remains to be opened directly, PEMEX has
reserved the right to reward contractors for successful oil and gas operations
conducted on behalf of PEMEX. In recent times, and following a 1958 Constitu-
tional amendment prohibiting payments to contractors in the form of a
percentage of production, PEMEX has issued service contracts, including
drilling, for a fixed fee." In Annex 602.3 of Chapter 6, NAFTA provides that
81. Article 27 of the original Mexican Constitution of 1917, as amended by the decree published in the
Diaro Oficial of January 20, 1960, provides: "In the nation is vested the direct ownership of all ... petroleum
and all solid, liquid, and gaseous hydrocarbons... !'
Regarding Mexico's ability to alienate these resources, the Constitution is no less equivocal: "In the case
of petroleum, and solid, liquid, or gaseous hydrocarbons or radioactive minerals, no concessions or contracts
will be granted nor may those that have been granted continue, and the Nation shall carry out the exploitation
of these products ...." Id.
82. Notwithstanding Mexico's Constitutional provisions, Mexico has since experimented with foreign
participation in the upstream sector of its petroleum industry. In 1949, Mexico permitted extensive foreign oil
company involvement in the exploration, exploitation, and production phase of its oil industry. At that time,
PEMEX entered into "risk contracts" with 16 foreign companies. The basic petroleum arrangement required
the companies to fund and assume the risk for each well. In return, each foreign company was allowed to
recover costs of drilling out of 50% of production revenues. Thereafter, the foreign company was compensated
for its risk by payment of 15% of the revenues out of the 50% production share (an arrangement not
uncommon under some of today's production sharing contracts). PEMEX addressed the constitutional
prohibition on foreign ownership of reserves by supervising the drilling and assuming control over the wells
once in production. However, the Mexican Constitution was amended in 1958 to prohibit all drilling contracts
under which compensation is derived from production. All preexisting "risk contracts" were rescinded.
Conine, Mexico, supra note 53, at 625, 641.
83. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
84. The most celebrated drilling contract is the contract awarded to Triton Intemational to drill an
exploratory well in the Bay of Campeche. PEMEX assumed ownership following drilling of the well. The
contract is reported to have fetched $20 million for Triton. Triton also was allowed to use its own equipment
and technology, as well as its own labor force. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTTr (1992), supra note 5, at 192 n. 8,
citing J. CoM. June 17, 1991, at 6B. The success of the Triton project in the Bay of Campeche may foster a
new willingness to make use of more efficient foreign contractors. See Baird, supra note 30. PEMEX issued
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the parties "shall allow state enterprises to negotiate performance clauses in their
service contracts."85 This NAFrA provision allows PEMEX to include in its
service contracts bonus or other "success" payments based on levels of
performance by the foreign contractor. Under this provision, PEMEX might
include in its service contact a bonus if hydrcabons ae discovered and ae
produced at a predetermined flow rate for a prescribed period of time. While it
may be contrary to the Mexican constitution to actually share in a percentage of
production, there would appear to be no prohibition on a fixed payment pegged
to certain performance criteria.
It -is worth emphasizing just how rare the current Mexican regime with
regard to exploration and production remains. It is not unusual for a country to
prohibit the outright ownership of a resource such as oil and gas to foreigners."
Ultimately, it is the manner in which "control" is exercised that determines the
balance between economic exigencies and legal constraints. Mexico has chosen
to exercise its control directly through PEMEX. Yet, many other nations around
the world with similar petroleum potential and similar concerns over foreign
ownership of natural resources have successfully developed petroleum
arrangements with foreign oil companies. These agreements allow the host
government to maximize its natural resource potential without abrogation of
control over either the resource or its development."
In many of these other jurisdictions, national law has interposed the
presence of a national or state oil company through which all foreign investment
in petroleum exploration and production must occur. Under petroleum
arrangements in most of these other nations, the foreign company's involvement
is highly risky in that the foreign oil company incurs the entire cost of drilling
an exploratory well. In the event a successful well is not drilled, the foreign
company receives no compensation while, under the terms of the petroleum
contract, the national oit company receives valuable information for future
exploration. Where a successful well is drilled, the foreign company recovers
its investment from a portion of production revenues, after which a system of
production sharing, royalties and taxes sets in, leaving the foreign production
company with anything between ten percent to fifty percent of the net production
from the well, depending on the level of production. 8
two other service contracts to U.S. drilling contractors to drill offshore wells in 1991-92. Jones, supra note 68,
at 7. Various sources in the industry speculate that between 40 and 50 service contracts have been awarded
to foreign contractors.
85. North American Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Annex 602.3 para. 4,32 IL.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA Annex].
86. A United Nations Resolution goes so far as to reflect a view "widely held in the Third World that
sovereignty is compromised if control over domestic oil reserves and other minerals is in the hands of foreign
corporations." Ernest E. Smith, Typical World Petroleum Arrangements, INT'l. RESOURCES LAW 9-1, 9-21
(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn., 1991), citing G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217; G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. AJ9400 (1973).
87. Professor Ernest E. Smith of the University of Texas has provided an excellent summary of those
types of arrangements. See id. at 9-10.
88. WORLD PErROLEUM ARRANOEMENTS 65 (1991).
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It is unclear why Mexico insisted on maintaining its monopoly on oil and
gas exploration and production. It appears that unless Mexico significantly
expands its capacity, both in production and refining, it will become a net
importer by the year 2000.89 While Mexico could delay this fate for several
years by eliminating exports, such a step would have drastic internal economic
consequences. It also may be futile to do so considering that domestic
requirements, growing at the rate of five percent per year, probably will consume
all of Mexico's output starting in the year 2004 unless significant additional
reserves are discovered. 90
B. Natural Gas Production
NAFTA adopts two important provisions for natural gas producers in the
United States. First, tariff rates on natural gas imported into Mexico from the
United States, currently set at ten percent, are to be phased out over a ten-year
period. Second, NAFTA contains a provision that allows natural gas producers
to negotiate supply contracts directly with end-users. 9' This provision makes
it easier for natural gas producers to make sales to end-users by eliminating the
need to deal through PEMEX.92 Conversely, NAFTA preserves the requirement
that all agreements, once negotiated, must pass through PEMEX which may
choose to block or delay their implementation.93 Moreover, PEMEX continues
to own and operate the pipeline network within Mexico, giving it a great deal of
control over U.S. natural gas exports.94
Nevertheless, so long as excess demand for natural gas in Mexico continues,
PEMEX has little incentive to interfere in the private contracting process. For
the past five years, during a time when sales contracts were negotiated directly
with PEMEX, U.S. exports of natural gas to Mexico have been rising. This is
due largely to the liberalization of the Mexican energy industry and increasing
industrialization along the border. Between 1988 and 1989, U.S. natural gas
exports to Mexico escalated dramatically when Valero Natural Gas Company
89. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT (1992), supra note 5, at 185.
90. Id. at 185 n.l.
91. NAFTA Annex 602.3(3), supra note 85.
92. Unlike the United States, Mexico has no specific law governing the import or export of natural gas,
although a license is required under its general trade laws. Licensing powers are generally shared between the
government and PEMEX, and the issuance of licenses often involves political as well as economic
considerations. See Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 634. In the United States, the Natural
Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) governs both the import and export of natural gas. Approval to export natural gas
is ordinarily granted unless the transaction is deemed to be inconsistent with the "public interest." 15 U.S.C.
§717b (1993). A number of administrative decisions and guidelines denominate the criteria to be applied by
the agency charged with reviewing import/export applications (now, the Office of Fossil Fuels, within the
Department of Energy). Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 633. For a full discussion of
the history and procedures associated with an application for the export or import of natural gas, see id. at 625-
33.
93. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, NAFrA: AN ASSESSMENT, (1993) [hereinafter HuFBAuER
& ScHoTr (1993)].
94. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 49, at 18-20.
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established a new border crossing between Texas and Mexico to supply PEMEX.
Valero began operating an additional crossing near Reynosa, Mexico in August
1992,"5 and exports can be expected to continue to rise. Enron Natural Gas and
El Paso Natural Gas are also in the process of establishing border crossings.
These might well bring cross-border capacity to over one billion cubic feet per
day.96 In addition, the Mexican government has announced plans to convert
450,000 vehicles to natural gas over the next four years, and U.S. natural gas
companies are already involved in establishing fueling stations to service this
future demand.97
In its pursuit of free trade in both directions, NAFTA creates new risks for
American natural gas producers by increasing the possibility of future competi-
tion with Mexican producers on the American domestic market. If Mexico once
again becomes capable of exporting gas into the United States, the U.S.
Department of Energy's import criteria probably will not be enforceable to the
extent that they conflict with NAFTA. Mexican imports may even threaten to
cut the price of natural gas produced in the United States. Mexico is not
expected to be in a position to generate surplus gas supplies for sale in the U.S.
market in the near future. However, as Mexican production of crude increases
and its associated gas-handling capability catches up, its natural gas production
could exceed its domestic demand. A long-term effect of NAFTA might
therefore be the importation of Mexican natural gas into the United States.
In sum, it would appear that NAFTA's impact on investment and production
of natural gas will be minor. Mexican tariffs on natural gas will be eliminated
over a ten-year period. However, the potentially positive impact of this tariff
reduction will be mitigated by other limitations placed on the natural gas trade,
particularly difficulties of transportation. 98
C. Refining and Marketing
Oil refining in Mexico falls under the exclusive control of PEMEX
Refining, one of the four subsidiaries created under PEMEX's restructuring plan.
While opportunities for foreign firms have expanded somewhat in the petrochem-
ical and drilling areas, refining remains tightly controlled by the Mexican
government.
NAFTA specifically reserves the "refining or processing of crude oil and
natural gas"99 in Mexico to the State. This is consistent with the existing legal
limitations preventing foreign ownership of Mexico's refineries or other
95. Id.
96. Id.; See also El Paso Charts Additional Transportation Path to Markets in Mexico, INSIDE F.E.R.C.,
Mar. 22, 1993, at 4.
97. Interview With American Gas Association Chairman David R. Jones, PIPELINE INDUSTRY, May 1993,
at 21.
98. Id.
99. NAFTA, Annex 602.3, supra note 85.
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processing facilities."° Overall, the Agreement should have minimal effect on
the ability of the United States to place investments, or to otherwise obtain
ownership interests, in Mexican refineries or product distribution chains.
With respect to distribution, the Agreement permits Mexico to reserve to its
own nationals and to Mexican enterprises (excluding foreign-owned) the
distribution of liquified petroleum gas (Annex I, Schedule of Mexico). In
addition, the Agreement excludes foreigners from the establishment and
operation of retail outlets engaged in the resale of gasoline, diesel, lubricants,
oils, and additives (Annex I, Schedule of Mexico).
Notwithstanding the explicit provisions of NAFTA, both the spirit of
cooperation engendered by NAFTA and the practical urgency of Mexico's need
for more and cleaner gasoline has led PEMEX to begin joining with foreign
companies to increase refining capacity. In early 1993, PEMEX and Shell Oil
Company finalized a joint venture agreement to split ownership of Shell's
215,000 b/d refinery in Deer Park, Texas.'' As part of the joint ownership
agreement, PEMEX will sell the refinery a long-term supply of Mayan crude oil,
and Shell wilt sell PEMEX a long-term supply of unleaded gasoline to meet
growing demand in Mexico. PEMEX also joined Shell in a $1 billion
construction project to upgrade the refinery to enable it to produce reformulated
motor fuels as required by the U.S. Clean Air Act, and to process large volumes
of heavy Mayan crude.'0 2 Shell and PEMEX held groundbreaking ceremonies
for the construction venture in July 1993.1"3
Mexico is actively seeking similar ventures, according to Emilio Lozoya
Thalmann, Mexico's Minister of Energy and Mines." Conoco has confirmed
that its parent company is talking with PEMEX about a joint venture similar to
the Deer Park agreement at Conoco's 160,000 b/d refinery in Lake Charles,
Louisiana." 5 PEMEX is also reported to be negotiating with Chevron for a
similar joint venture at Chevron's Port Arthur, Texas, refinery."°
PEMEX has similarly engaged in joint ventures to market and to distribute
petroleum products. Mexican private investors recently joined with the Spanish
petroleum firm, Repsol, to distribute petroleum products in Mexico and other
Latin American countries. This new company is forty percent owned by Repsol
and sixty percent owned by Mexican investors.'0 ' The new investment is
expected to help upgrade refinery operations at Tula, Salina Cruz, and
Cadereyta. 108
100. Conine, Natural Gas Transactions, supra note 11, at 628 n.9.
101. Shell, Pemex Team Up in Refining Venture, OIL & GAS J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 25.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Mexico Seeks Foreign Investment in Certain Energy and Mining Areas, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
(Apr. 14, 1993) [hereinafter Mexico Seeks Foreign Investment]; Mexican Minister Says U.S. Has Prospects -
But Not to Produce Oil, PLAT-r's OILRAM NEWS, Apr. 8, 1993, at 6.
105. OGJ Newsletter, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 15, 1993, at 2.
106. Pemex's Refining Chief Says More U.S. Ventures Imminent, HEROLD'S OIL HEADLINER, Dec. 7, 1992,
at 1.




Private Mexican investors have also gained access to Mexico's lubricants
facilities and retail gasoline outlets.' 9 According to one report, "[tihe state
company's strategy is to sell off assets that it can effectively control without




Mexico classifies its petrochemicals as either "basic," "secondary," or
"tertiary.' "Basic" petrochemicals are those derived from the first transfor-
mation of crude petroleum or natural gas." 2  Under the 1958 Petrochemical
Law, PEMEX enjoys the exclusive right to produce basic petrochemicals." 3
The Mexican government, however, has gradually reduced the number of
petrochemicals classified as "basic" in order to encourage private investment in
the petrochemical industry."4 The most recent reclassification occurred in
August 1992, when the Mexican government reduced the number of basic
petrochemicals to eight: ethane, propane, butanes, pentanes, hexanes, heptanes,
carbon black feedstock, and naphthas." 5
Although PEMEX retains exclusive control over basic petrochemical
production, Mexico's need for capital investment led to the creation in 1989 of
a program where foreign companies could supply capital and technology for
plant construction in exchange for petrochemicals produced at the plant."6
The foreign companies can build the plants under PEMEX supervision, although
PEMEX must operate them."
7
"Secondary" petrochemicals are those derived from further processing of
basic petrochemicals." 8 Mexico now classifies sixty-six petrochemicals as
109. Pemex Reshuffles Parts, supra note 32, at 3. "Control of the state lubricants operation recently went
to a private firm in Guadalajara for over $250 million, with PEMEX retaining a minority holding. Retail
gasoline sales have been largely outside the state sector for years, and PEMEX disposed of its last stations in
1992." Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S.- MEXICO ENERGY, supra note 40, at 1.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 4.
114. In 1986, Mexico reclassified 36 petrochemicals from basic to secondary, leaving 34 basic
petrochemicals. U.S.-MExIco ENERGY, supra note 40, at 4. In 1989, Mexico further reduced the number of
basic petrochemicals to 20. 1989 Resolution Reclassifying Specified Petrochemical Products as Basic or
Secondary Petrochemicals, DIARIO OFICIAL (August 15, 1989). This number dropped to 19 in 1991, when
Mexico reclassified MTBE as a secondary petrochemical. Pemex, supra note 39, at 25.
115. This reclassification was published in the 1992 Resolution Reclassifying Specified Petrochemical
Products as Basic or Secondary Petrochemicals, DLARIo OFiciAL (August 15, 1989); U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 49, at 19-1, n.l.
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secondary, a significant reduction from the over 700 petrochemicals that were
listed in 1989.' 9 Companies planning to produce any of the sixty-six petro-
chemicals classified as secondary must obtain a production license from the
Petrochemical Commission of the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Parastatal
Industry (SEMIP). ° Before NAFTA, Mexican law limited foreign investment
in the manufacture and distribution of secondary petrochemicals to a forty
percent equity share. However, as part of its 1989 reform, Mexico did allow
foreign investors to acquire up to 100% ownership of a secondary petrochemical
plant if the investor entered into a special trust arrangement with a Mexican
credit institution. The trustee retained direct control of the operation while
disbursing profits to the foreign investor. 2 '
'Tertiary" petrochemicals are those derived from secondary petrochemicals
and include all petrochemicals not classified as either basic or secondary. 22
Even before NAFTA, Mexican law already permitted 100% foreign ownership
of tertiary petrochemical production facilities.
2. NAFTA Provisions Affecting Petrochemicals
Under Annex 602.3 of NAFTA, Mexico reserves to itself investment in and
production of basic petrochemicals and their feedstocks.' Mexico also
reserves to itself all foreign trade, transportation, storage, and distribution of
basic petrochemicals. This reflects the existing prohibition of foreign ownership
of the feedstock and basic products of the petrochemical industry under Mexican
law.
Article 602.2 of NAFTA, however, expands on Mexico's 1992 reclassifica-
tion of petrochemicals, limiting to five the number of basic petrochemicals that
are reserved exclusively to the State. 24 Private investment in ethanes, butanes,
pentanes, hexanes, and heptanes remains prohibited. The production and sale of
benzene, toluene, xylene, naphthalene, phenols, creosote oils, distillates,
kerosene, naphthas, LNG, and certain ethylenes, propylenes, butylene, and
butadienes are no longer within the definition of "basic petrochemicals" and
consequently should now be available for investment by NAFTA parties.
Furthermore, NAFTA also eliminates Mexico's forty percent limit on foreign
investment in secondary petrochemicals, thereby permitting 100% ownership for
their production.2 2 NAFTA does not, however, affect the registration
requirements established by the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Parastatal
Industry.
119. Id.
120. HUFBAUER & ScHorr (1992), supra note 5, at 196.
121. U.S.-MExtco ENERGY, supra note 40, at 4.
122. Id.
123. NAFTA Annex 602.3, supra note 85.
124. See discussion supra note 114.
125. U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 49, at 19-2. Investment in Mexican businesses is subject to
Article 138 of NAFTA, which allows Mexico to require government approval for takeovers of existing
businesses starting at $25 million and increasing to $150 million over the next 10 years.
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For those basic petrochemicals that remain the exclusive province of the
state, NAFTA limits export taxes on these fractions. Under NAFVA, Mexico is
unable to maintain an export tax on any basic petrochemicals unless an equal
duty is levied on products destined for internal consumption. Finally, NAFTA
limits the circumstances under which Mexico may place import duties and tariffs
on a basic petrochemical. Under NAFTA, Mexico agrees to eliminate its tariffs
on primary petrochemicals over a ten-year period.
26
As the NAFTA provisions suggest, Mexico is actively seeking foreign
investment in secondary petrochemicals. 27  PEMEX has reached agreements
with several foreign investors who have agreed to invest in completion of
petrochemical facilities in return for a guaranteed supply of the petrochemical per
year.128 As an example, Valero Energy Corp. signed agreements with PEMEX
in April 1993, for the building of a 13,000 b/d MTBE plant in Veracruz.'
29
Valero owns thirty-five percent of Productos Ecologicos S.A. de C. V (Proesa),
which entered into two fifteen-year contracts with PEMEX for the supply of the
plant's butane feedstock and the sale of MTBE. Valero will operate the plant,
which will replicate the MTBE unit at its Corpus Christi refinery. 3 Two
Mexican partners, Grupo Informin and Banamex S.A. de C.V own fifty-five
percent of Proesa, and the Spanish construction firm of Dragados y Construccio-
nes S.A. has a ten percent share. 3' The plant is estimated to cost about $350
million and is expected to come into operation during the second half of
1995.132 Furthermore, PEMEX intends to fully privatize its petrochemical
business, although full-scale plans are on hold until conclusion of negotiations
on the side agreements to NAFTA.J3 3 A private firm in Guadalajara recently
obtained control of the state lubricants operation for over $250 million, with
PEMEX retaining a minority holding.3 4 In addition, PEMEX officials have
begun talks with British Petroleum for possible sale of PEMEX's ethylene
plants. 135
Despite these liberalizations, passage of NAFTA may not lead to substantial
increases in U.S. investment in Mexico's petrochemical industry. The U.S.
International Trade Commission points out that the acquisition or construction
126. Id.
127. Mexico Seeks Foreign Investment, supra note 104.
128. In 1990, Mexico completed two petrochemical facilities under such arrangements. Celanese paid $15
million to PEMEX to complete an acetaldehyde plant at PEMEX's Morelos complex in return for 240,000
metric tons of acetaldehyde per year. Cydsa pre-paid PEMEX nearly $9 million to complete an acrylonitrile
plant in return for 72,000 metric tons of the petrochemical per year. Christine MacDonald, Foreign Companies
Sign on with Pemex, Bus. MEX., Aug. 1991, at 22.
129. Valero, Pemex Sign Agreements to Build $350 Million MTBE Plant in Veracruz, THE OIL DAILY, Apr.
27, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter Valero, Pemex].
130. Jim Drummond, Valero Advances Mexican MTBE Plant, REFINING HORIZONS, Mar. 1993 Issue A,
at 19 (Special Pub. of THE On. DAILY).
131. Id.
132. Valero, Pemex, supra note 129, at 4.
133. OGJ Newsletter, OIL & GAS J., May 17, 1993, at 3. For a discussion of the side agreements, see infra
part IV.B.
134. Pemex Reshuffles Parts, supra note 32, at 3.
135. OGJ Newsletter, supra note 133, at 3.
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of a petrochemical plant is highly capital-intensive." 6 U.S. investors may be
further deterred by the fact that such a plant would have to rely on PEMEX for
most of its feedstock, would need to be located near a PEMEX plant producing
feedstock, and would have to sell its product either to PEMEX or in competition
with PEMEX.
137
The U.S. General Accounting Office has similarly identified a variety of
factors that will discourage increased U.S. investment in the Mexican petrochem-
ical sector, notwithstanding the passage of NAFTA." s These include world-
wide excess production capacity for basic petrochemicals, insufficient basic
petrochemical production in Mexico, fear that government reforms may be
reversible, an absence of adequate intellectual property protection, and an
absence of sufficient investment protection for U.S. businesses." 9 On the other
hand, some factors may encourage investment, especially Mexico's established
infrastructure for the manufacture of petrochemicals, abundant raw materials in
Mexico, and a favorable location."4
E. Petroleum Service and Supply Sector
The most direct impact of NAFTA on the petroleum industry will almost
certainly occur in the areas of service and supply. NAFTA significantly expands
opportunities for drilling contractors, seismic contractors and subcontractors of
basic services and supplies for the oil and gas industry in Mexico. 4
The Agreement benefits the service and supply sectors in three main ways:
(i) by limiting the barriers on competitive bidding through the creation of a
tender system which will provide significant opportunities for greater participa-
tion by U.S. contractors and suppliers, (ii) by reducing tariffs on equipment, and
(iii) by allowing state enterprises to negotiate performance clauses in their
drilling contracts.1 4 2
1. GATT Code on Procurement
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a multilateral
agreement for regulating international trade and reducing trade barriers. GATT
members afford one another "Most Favored Nation" status, limit their maximum
136. Mexico Seeks Foreign Investment, supra note 104.
137. Id.
138. U.S.-MExico ENERGY, supra note 40, at 5.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 6.
141. It is not surprising that the Petroleum Equipment Suppliers Association (PESA), pointing to the loss
of 450,000 jobs in the U.S. oil and gas industry since 1982, has urged passage of NAFrA. Jones, supra
note 68, at 1.
142. See infra part III.E.4.
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import duties, provide for non-discrimination against foreign goods that have
cleared customs, limit domestic subsidies, restrict import quotas, and eliminate
export restraints. 43  In July 1986, Mexico became a signatory of GATT. A
large number of Mexican local laws and regulations were amended to incorporate
GAT17 standards." One result has been that the average Mexican duty on
imports has plunged from 100% in 1986 to 11% by 1990. 41 Increased
importation of foreign goods also helped to lower inflation, which was 162% in
1987 and only 19% by 1991.' 46
Article III of GAT requires that all national regulations respecting taxation
and the sale of products accord "national treatment" to the products of other
GAT members. Government purchases, however, are exempt from this
requirement." GATT members viewed government procurement as part of
the exercise of national sovereignty, and nothing in GAT itself requires a
country to open its government contracts to foreign bidders.
By the 1970s, however, leading developed nations were ready to reach an
accommodation on government procurement, broadly extending the reach of
GATT to the public sector. At the Tokyo Round, a separate code was negotiated
known as the Agreement on Government Procurement."' The Code on
Procurement establishes detailed rules to implement the principle of "national
treatment" in the sphere of public contracts, including open-bidding requirements,
a procedure for informing foreign bidders why their bids were rejected, and a
procedure for appeal and dispute-resolution. 4 9
143. GATT refers to separate schedules that set reciprocal tariff limits and rules for eliminating nontariff
barriers. These limits are periodically adjusted in negotiations known as "Rounds," such as the "Tokyo Round"
in 1973-79 and the current "Uruguay Round." For an excellent introduction to GATT, see JOHN JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1989).
144. These have included, among others, modifications to the Regulations Against Unfair Trade Practices,
the Anti-dumping Code, the Code of Import Licenses, and the Code of Customs Valuations.
145. Eduardo T. Siqueiros, Legal Framework for the Sale of Goods into Mexico, 12 HOus. J. OF INT'L L.
291, 292, 294 (1990).
146. Aureliano Gonzalez-Baz, A Mexican Perspective on the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Environment, 18 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 235, 236 (1992). "Mexico joined GAT, and in literally an overnight
period, Mexican manufacturers were faced with the fact that foreign products, which in the past had averaged
at a rate of 100 to 110%, suddenly had a maximum of 20% and an average of 9.8% duty. Also, 98% of all
products no longer required an import license." Id.
147. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. "The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes .... " Because
Article I also makes reference to Article III, it is arguable that government procurement policies are also
exempt from the "Most Favored Nation" rules. Id. Art. III, I 8(a)
148. Article 11, 1 1 of GATT provides as follows: "With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and
practices regarding government procurement.., the Parties shall provide... treatment no less favorable than:
(a) that accorded to domestic products and suppliers; and (b) that accorded to products and suppliers of any
other Party."
149. The main signatories to the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement are the developed
countries, for example the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Mexico is not a signatory of the
Code on Procurement, and therefore, PEMEX policies in awarding contracts have not afforded American
bidders equal treatment with Mexican competitors. The adoption of Chapter 10 of NAFTA, therefore, marks
a significant departure from current practices. Chapter 10 of NAFTA creates the equivalent of the GA'I" Code
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2. NAFTA Procurement Provisions
Under NAFTA, PEMEX must open up half its procurement to bids from
foreign companies within the first year of the Agreement, and must gradually
open up all its procurement to foreign bidders within ten years. 50  All
contracts over specified amounts proposed for award by PEMEX are subject to
these provisions of the Agreement. 5 '
The procurement provisions of Chapter 10, although lengthy, are relatively
straightforward. Like the GATT Code on Procurement, they require each
NAFrA party to accord goods, services, or suppliers from any other NAFTA
Party treatment "no less favorable" than that accorded to goods, services or
suppliers from any of the other NAFTA parties, including those from that
country itself. In this way, Article 1003 effectively combines both "most
favored" and "national treatment" into a single category. 152 The provisions of
Article 1003 also prohibit the use of technical specifications to the advantage of
domestic contractors. NAFTA's procurement provisions include the creation of
an extensive "tender" or bid process that addresses the qualifications of
suppliers, the contents of the invitation to bid, deadlines, tender documentation,
awards, bid challenges, and exceptions to the tender process. "Rules of
Origin" 53  also are promulgated, which determine the application of any
associated tariffs.
3. "Most Favored Nation" Status; "National Treatment"
In Article 1003, NAFTA requires that, for all matters covered by the
procurement provisions, each party must accord "Most Favored Nation" status
to the goods, services, and suppliers of the other parties. Thus, each party must
treat the goods, services, and suppliers of the other party no less favorably than
the goods, services, and suppliers of its most favored providers, including
national entities. Therefore, in awarding government contracts, no party may
on Government Procurement, but only among the three nations of Canada, Mexico and the United States.
150. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1002, Annexes 1002.3 (Schedule of Mexico), 1002.6, and 1002.7.
151. The thresholds are set as follows: (1) U.S. $250,000 for "goods contracts;" (2) U.S. $250,000 for
"services contracts" (which excludes construction services contracts); (3) U.S. $8.0 million for construction
services contracts.
The determination of contract value is covered in NAFTA, art. 1002.3, which requires that the contract
value must take into account "all forms of remuneration, including premiums, fees, commissions and interest."
Id. art. 1002.(3). It attempts to avoid manipulation of the spirit of the provision by setting rigid standards for
the valuation of awards that result in more than one contract or contracts that are awarded in separate parts.
Id. Annex 1002.3(4). NAFTA, art. 1002.3(b) subjects entities listed in Annex 1002.3 (Schedule of Mexico)
to these thresholds. PEMEX is listed in Annex 1002.3 among the entities subject to this schedule. It is noted
that this schedule does not apply to the procurement of "fuels and gas" by PEMEX.
152. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1003.




discriminate against any local entities on the basis of foreign affiliation or
ownership by persons or entities located in another NAFTA party." 4
4. Use of Technical Specifications as Non-Tariff
Trade Barriers
Article 1007 prohibits each party from developing technical specifications
with the purpose or effect of creating "unnecessary obstacles" to trade. These
obstacles might arise from specified requirements governing "quality, perfor-
mance, safety and dimensions, symbols, terminology, packaging, marking [or]
labelling . .." Production processes and methods may also come within the
scope of this prohibition. 155 To this end, each party is required to ensure that
the technical specifications called for by its entities in awarding contracts are
stated in terms of "performance criteria" instead of "design or descriptive
characteristics." Reference to "international standards, national technical
regulations, recognized national standards or building codes" is required, where
appropriate. 5 6 Under NAFTA, specific trademark and other peculiar referenc-
es are prohibited except where there is no other way to describe the require-
ments, and in these instances, the relevant procurement regulations must specify
that goods, services, or suppliers meeting "equivalent" standards are also accept-
able.1 57
5. Tender Process
NAFTA requires that public entities adopt transparent tender processes
designed to maximize competition and to eliminate discrimination and local
preference. 5 The procurement provisions establish three types of tender
processes: "open," "selective," and "limited." The open process allows
participation by all qualified parties; the selective process involves suppliers
invited to bid by procuring entity; and the limited process allows an entity to
forego the open process if the contract calls for the supply of unique materials,
additional supplies of previously supplied materials, or where the goods or
services desired could not be obtained in time under the open process.
a) Qualifications of Suppliers. A basic premise of NAFTA's qualifications
provisions is that no supplier should be disqualified from bidding for a contract
from a government entity in one North American country merely because it is
154. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1003(2). An exception exists where the laws or policies of the denying
party would prohibit such a transaction. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 11 13(l)(b).
155. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1007(1).
156. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1007(2).
157. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1007(3).
158. See generally NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1008. Article 1008 provides that "each Party shall ensure
that its entities: (a) do not provide to any supplier information with regard to a specific procurement in a
manner that would have the effect of precluding competition; and (b) provide all suppliers equal access to
information with respect to a procurement during the period prior to the issuance of any notice or tender
documentation."
1994]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
a supplier from another North American country. In developing this premise,
Article 1009 sets out an extensive list of considerations to which public and
quasi-public entities of each party must adhere in developing their procurement
procedures. Collectively, these provisions are intended to ensure that all
interested suppliers from any of the three NAFTA countries have an equal
opportunity to qualify for a particular award. 59 They do, however, allow for
disqualification on the basis of "bankruptcy"" or "false declarations."
Article 1009 strives for parity and seeks to establish open and predictable
processes for qualification. It should be noted, however, that in determining the
"financial, commercial and technical capacity of a supplier," a party entity may
consider the qualifying party's track record, not only globally, but specifically
in the territory of that party.' 6' Thus, in theory, PEMEX could legitimately
award a contract to one U.S. company seeking to provide oilfield equipment to
PEMEX over another on the basis of its prior activities in Mexico. This
provision could conceivably serve as a loophole permitting continued favoritism
on behalf of local companies in the awarding of contracts.
b) Invitation to Participate; Open Tender. Under Chapter 10 of NAFTA,
each tender process (except for "limited tenders" discussed infra) begins with the
publication of an "Invitation to Participate."' 62 The contents of the invitation
must include the following: whether the tender process is open or selective; a
description of the goods or services solicited; relevant dates for bidding and
performance; 63 relevant response information; relevant terms and conditions
of the contract; and a statement of the technical and economic requirements of
the bidder."6  A short form of the invitation, known as "notice of planned
procurement," may be utilized by state entities such as PEMEX, though NAFTA
requires it must contain most of the information required in the general
invitation. 65 Finally, an invitation must advise interested bidders whether the
procuring entity intends to "negotiate" the final terms of the award.t66 Such
negotiations are held primarily to narrow the list of suppliers under the bid
159. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1009(2).
160. Article 1009 does not indicate whether current or previous banlkruptcy provides a basis for
disqualification.
161. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1009(2)(c).
162. NAFFA, supra note 1, art. 1010.
163. In addition, NAFTA, art. 1015 addresses the procedures and criteria to be utilized by procuring entities
for the "submission, receipt and opening of tenders and the awarding of contracts .... "
164. Required tender documentation is addressed in NAFTA, art. 1013, which provides in explicit detail
all of the information that must be included to suppliers. It supplements the information required in the
invitation to participate.
165. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1010(3). In addition, entities like PEMEX may utilize as an invitation to
participate a "notice regarding a qualification system," which gives potential suppliers an opportunity to assess
their interest. Again, that notice must strive to include as much of the basic information described above as
possible. Id. art. 1010(5).
166. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1014(1). A "negotiated" tender is allowed where the negotiation is
advised in the invitation and where it appears from the tenders submitted that no one tender is superior on the
basis of the tender criteria.
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criteria and ultimately to revise the criteria for incorporation into new ten-
ders. 1 67
c) Selective and limited tender processes. As an alternative to the "open"
tender process, the "selective" tender process allows PEMEX to maintain a list
of qualified suppliers to which it can turn in issuing invitations "consistent with
the efficient operation of the procurement system.' 161 It is designed to forego
the open process when that process does not produce a satisfactory result under
the circumstances facing the procuring entity. Where a selective tendering
process is involved, the procuring entity must publish, in an approved publica-
tion, a notice of the various supplier lists it maintains and the corresponding
goods and services for which it qualifies. 69  The publication provides an
opportunity for other interested parties to seek inclusion on the list or to contest
the inclusion of others. Nonetheless, suppliers not on the list will be able to
submit a bid, so long as they meet the qualifications requirements of Article
1009(2). However, the entity awarding the contract may limit the number of
such additional suppliers in the interest of "the efficient operation of the
procurement system," though they must then explain their reasons for refusing
to admit the supplier to tender. 70
NAFTA also permits a "limited" tender process to be utilized for, among
other things, additional deliveries of a previously tendered contract for purchases
under "exceptionally advantageous conditions," such as unusual disposals,
liquidations, receiverships, or for situations of "extreme urgency brought about
by [unforeseeable] events."'' The limited tender process is intended to be
utilized sparingly. The procuring entity is required to report the details of each
limited tender process and to include within each report its justification for the
use of the limited process.
d) Awards. NAFTA requires government entities to award contracts to
suppliers who are determined by the procuring entity to be fully capable of
undertaking the contract and whose bid is either the lowest or the "most
advantageous," based on the tender documentation. 172 Notice of each award,
including the major elements of the contract, must be published no later than
seventy-two days from the award. While an award cannot be conditioned on
work experience in Mexico, under the terms of NAFTA, a Mexican entity like
PEMEX can take into account a bidder's prior "business activity" in Mexico in
its determination of the "financial, commercial, and technical capacity of a
supplier."
e) Bid challenge. Like the GATT Code on Procurement, NAFTA provides
a bid challenge procedure to redress any aspect of the procurement process,
including the award. 171 Much of the information required to be published by
167. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1014(4).
168. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1011(1).
169. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1010(6).
170. NAFrA, supra note 1, arts. 1011(3) and 10 11(4).
171. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1016.
172. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1015(4).
173. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 1017.
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the procuring entity is intended to provide sufficient information to give
dissatisfied bidders an opportunity to evaluate whether a bid challenge is
warranted. An overall outline of the bid challenge procedure is provided in
Article 1017. Consistent with the overall intent of NAFrA, the particular details
of bid challenging procedures, such as specification of the reviewing authority,
time limits for raising a challenge, and most importantly, review standards have
been delegated to the individual parties to develop and implement.
J) Other procurement provisions. The remaining provisions of the
procurement chapter of NAFTA address the following topics: national security
and public policy exceptions to the general provisions;' 74 the provision of
information requested by other NAFTA countries or by their suppliers regarding
the procurement process or specific procurement procedures and awards; 75
technical cooperation in maximizing access to government procurement
opportunities; 7 6 the establishment of joint programs for small businesses; 7
the divestiture of procurement entities; 78 and provisions for further negotia-
tions towards "substantial liberalization" of each party's procurement mar-
kets. 79
g) Conclusion. Though some provisions of NAFTA allow exceptions to
the general principle of non-discrimination in the award of government contracts,
and though open-bidding requirements will only be fully adopted by PEMEX
over the next ten years, this chapter of the Agreement promises significant
benefits in terms of opening up future PEMEX contracts to U.S. bidders.
F Tariffs
1. Gradual Reduction of Tariff Rates
In addition to the tariff reductions already occasioned when Mexico became
a signatory of GATI' in 1986, part two of NAFTA ("Trade in Goods,"
comprising Chapters 3 to 8) heralds further tariff reductions between Mexico and
the United States. The Agreement provides for a gradual elimination of customs
duties which apply to almost every conceivable piece of equipment and manufac-
tured good subject to duty, including oilfield service equipment. NAFTA Article
301 provides for "national treatment" in terms of internal taxation and regulation
to be afforded to goods produced in the territory of another party to the
Agreement, similar to Article III of GATT. NAFTA Article 302(3) further states
174. NAF'TA, supra note 1, art. 1018 (Exceptions) provides that a Party may be excepted from the
requirements of Chapter 10 where it is necessary for the protection of "essential security interests." A party
also may adopt additional measures it considers necessary for the protection of certain public purposes, such
as public morals, protection of intellectual property, or protection of life.
175. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1019: Provision of Information.
176. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1020: Technical Cooperation.
177. NAFI'A, supra note 1, art. 1021: Joint Programs for Small Businesses.
178. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1023: Divesture of Entities.
179. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1024: Further Negotiations.
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that the parties agree not to increase any existing tariff or customs duties, and
each party further agrees to "progressively eliminate its customs duties in
originating goods" in accordance with schedules that are attached to the
Agreement. The schedules reduce tariffs on various goods at different rates over
varied periods of time. Tariffs on some goods will be completely eliminated
upon implementation of the Agreement; most others will be eliminated in five,
ten, or fifteen equal annual stages over the next fifteen years. 80
The rules of NAFTA governing tariff reductions defy meaningful
summarization. Current tariff rates on oilfield equipment exported to Mexico are
generally in the twenty percent rate category. Most of those tariffs are reduced
to sixteen percent the first year NAFTA is effective, and will be phased out over
an eight-year period thereafter. In general, tariffs on all oilfield equipment will
be eliminated within five to ten years, with a large number of tariffs being
eliminated immediately. 81 With respect to import controls, Annex 301.3,
section B of NAFTA also permits Mexico, for the next ten years, to require
special permits for the importation of used goods, including, inter alia, pumps,
concrete pumps for liquids, mobile lifting frames, cranes, derricks, bull-dozers,
sinking or boring machinery, mobile, and other drilling derricks.
2. Significance of Rules of Origin
Not all goods shipped from the United States into Mexico necessarily
benefit from these lower tariff schedules. Only so-called North American
"originating" goods are eligible for tariff reductions under NAFTA. Goods are
considered as "originating" only when they qualify as such under the complex
rules of origin set forth in Chapter Four of the Agreement.
A good is naturally considered as "originating" in one of the NAFTA
countries when it is "wholly obtained or when it is produced in the territory of
one or more of the parties . . . " or produced entirely in the territory of one of
the parties out of "originating materials."'8 2  However, in our economically
interdependent world, many goods assembled or produced in the United States,
Canada, or Mexico are made out of non-originating materials or parts. Many of
these products will also qualify under NAFTA as "originating goods," and
thereby obtain lower tariff rates.
Under NAFTA, for example, a good may often be considered as "originat-
ing" in a NAFTA country if some or all of the non-originating materials used in
the production of the good undergo changes in their tariff classification as
180. See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 302.2, "Tariff Elimination." On the other U.S. side, see the North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
181. Id.; See U.S. ITr'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 49, at 18-20. According to this assessment,
approximately 96.8% of the U.S. energy imports from Mexico, mainly crude oil, will gradually have their
duties removed over the next 10 years. About 84.7% of Mexican imports from the U.S. in the energy sector
are already duty-free, and another 11.6% of Mexican imports from the U.S. will have their duties phased out
over 10 years. Id. at F-2.
182. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 401(a), (c); see also the seperate rules for country-of-origin marking in
Annex 311 and the new U.S. rules regarding country-of-origin marking at 19 C.F.R. § 102.11 (issued in 59
Fed. Reg. 110-140 (Jan. 3, 1994)).
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specified in NAFrA, as a result of the production occurring entirely in that
NAFTA country.1 3  For instance, Korean steel is imported into the United
States under a tariff classification for steel. It is then processed into steel alloy
drill pipe with a different tariff classification. The drill pipe might now qualify
as "originating" in the United States and therefore be imported into Mexico
under the lower tariff rates established by NAFTA and implemented by Mexico
in its new tariff schedule.'t 4
The NAFTA rules of origin are obviously too complicated to allow any
more elaborate discussion here. As one indication of their complexity, the rules
of origin in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement"8 5 are less than one page
long, 86 whereas the same rules are seventy-three pages long in NAFTA.'87
The rules were made much more specific in order to accommodate industry
concerns about specific products. The general principle, however, is clear.
These rules will have to be consulted carefully by suppliers and others engaged
in cross-border transactions in order to determine which equipment and goods
will qualify for the reduced tariffs established by NAFTA.
IV ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR PROVISIONS OF NAFTA
The environmental and labor provisions are two important areas of NAFTA
which have caused widespread concern. American businesses that hope to
conduct future operations in Mexico will have to familiarize themselves not only
with the provisions of the Agreement itself, but with its side agreements on the
environment and labor, and with Mexican environmental and labor laws and
regulations. The next section of this article briefly surveys this field.
NAFTA affirms the right of each country to adopt its own labor and
environmental standards, while forbidding the lowering of these standards for
183. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 401(b).
184. In many cases, not only changes in tariff classification but also special rules regarding "regional value
content" will have to be considered to determine whether a product qualifies as originating. The regional value
content can be calculated in several ways. One method is by calculating the difference between the transaction
value of the good and the value of the non-originating parts used in producing the good, divided by the
transaction value of the good. This equation purportedly yields the percentage of value that was added to the
good by the assembly or production that took place on the territory of a NAFTA party. In the case of some
goods, both a change in tariff classification must occur and special "regional value content" rules must be
satisfied. The complicated regional value content rules are explained in art. 402(2) of the Agreement.
185. The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement was implemented by the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1516a & 1677f(d)(1988)), as amended by the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382, § 134,
104 Stat. 629 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a & 1677f (Supp. IV 1992)), and by the regulations of the Int'l
Trade Admin., 19 C.F.R. pt. 356, and of the Int'l Trade Commn., 19 C.F.R. pt. 207 subpt. G.
186. Section XVI of the Harmonized Tariff, dealing with machinery, mechanical appliances, and electrical
equipment.
187. NAFTA. Annex 401.1, supra note 1.
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purposes of attracting investment. Although the preamble to the Agreement
resolves to "improve working conditions" and to "strengthen the development
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations," NAFTA does not
impose any specific regulatory measures for protection of workers or the
environment."' 8 Therefore, NAFTA is not likely to have a direct impact on the
substance of Mexico's environmental or labor regulations.
In contrast, NAFTA may have significant indirect effects that could
strengthen enforcement of Mexican laws on labor and the environment.
Companies planning to operate in Mexico may, therefore, need to comply with
elaborate protection for workers and the environment under existing Mexican
law.
A. Specific NAFTA Provisions
Chapter 9 of NAFTA sets out the basic rights and obligations of NAFTA
parties with respect to environmental and labor standards.!89 Article 904(2)
provides that "each party may, in pursuing its legitimate objective of safety or
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment, or
consumers, establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate in
accordance with Article 907(3)." 'i9° Such measures must, however, accord
non-discriminatory "national treatment" and "most favored nation" status to the
goods and service providers of other NAFTA parties.'
91
The right to adopt environmental and labor standards-related measures
include the right to ban imports of nonconforming goods or services. 92 No
party, however, may adopt such a measure with the intent or effect of creating
an "unnecessary obstacle to trade" between NAFTA parties. 193 Under Article
905, each country agrees to use international standards as the basis for its own
standards-related measures, "except where such standards would be an ineffective
or inappropriate means to fulfill its legitimate objectives."''94 Although this
Article allows each party to adopt standards that result in a higher level of
protection than international standards, it leaves significant discretion with each
party to determine its "appropriate" level of protection.
With respect to the environment, NAFTA also provides that obligations of
a NAFFA party in specified international agreements regarding endangered
species, ozone depletion, hazardous waste disposal, and protection of the border
188. NAFTA, supra note 1, pmbl.
189. NAFTA, Chapter 9 applies to all standards-related measures except sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, which are addressed in Chapter 7B.
190. NAFrA, art. 907(3) contains provisions against arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions in the level of
protection between similar goods and services.
191. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 904(3).
192. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904(1).
193. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 904(4).
194. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 905.
1994]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
environment will prevail over any other inconsistent NAFTA provisions, subject
to a requirement to minimize the inconsistency with NAFTA.' 9'
Despite its provisions taking into account environmental concerns, NAFTA
has been widely criticized by environmental groups for its failure to provide
enforcement mechanisms with teeth. NAFTA labor standards have similarly
been criticized for their absence of enforcement provisions. NAFTA explicitly
states that the parties will work together to enhance the level of protection of
health, safety, and the environment, 96 as well as to strive to make standards
compatible to all three parties. 197 Nevertheless, provisions addressing compli-
ance with the Agreement are notably weak. Article 902 makes each party
responsible for ensuring compliance with standards-related provisions through its
own provincial or state governments. As a consequence, the NAFTA-created
committee on standards-related measures lacks any direct authority to take
enforcement actions. 198 Moreover, while NAFTA recognizes the inappropriate-
ness of relaxing environmental standards in order to encourage investment under
NAFTA itself, a party concerned about lax environmental enforcement in another
party would have no remedies available to it other than consultations with the
other party.199
B. NAFTA Side Agreements
At the insistence of the Clinton Administration, negotiations were conducted
among the NAFTA parties for "side agreements" on the environment, labor, and
import surges.2 ° These new side agreements on the enforcement of national
environmental and labor laws will mean that companies operating in Mexico will
have to comply with stricter standards in both of these areas. President Clinton
needed these side agreements to persuade the Democratic majority in Congress
to support NAFTA and to placate special interests such as the sugar, citrus, and
wheat lobbies. 201
A key issue in the negotiation of the side agreements was the proposed
creation of tri-national commissions designed to administer the agreements, to
improve the enforcement of national labor and environmental laws, to resolve
disputes, and to serve as fora for improving standards and cooperation on labor
and environmental issues. °' Canadian and Mexican negotiators initially
opposed U.S. proposals entrusting the proposed commissions with powers of
195. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 104.
196. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906(1).
197. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 906(2).
198. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 913.
199. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114.
200. See Testimony of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, Before the Committee on
Commerce, Science & Transportation (1993), [hereinafter Kantor Testimony] (provided by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative).
201. Sidney Weintraub & Rogelio Ramirez De La O, Personal View: Where Mexico Should Draw the Line,
FIN. TIMES, June 15, 1993; Western Governors' Group Hears Discussion of NAFTA, DAILY REP. FOR




dispute resolution, particularly the use of trade sanctions to enforce compli-
ance. 20 3 Canadian negotiators opposed the U.S. proposal to create an indepen-
dent secretariat with powers to override the national sovereignty of the NAFTA
parties. Mexican negotiators likewise stressed that mechanisms used to ensure
compliance must have "absolute respect" for national laws,2 4 and they
adamantly opposed the creation of any structures and procedures that might be
employed as protectionist tools for preventing Mexican imports from crossing
into the United States.2 5 U.S. negotiators, on the other hand, maintained that
the creation of an institutional dispute resolution mechanism was indispensable
for resolving any future "persistent problems."2 °' Consequently, they urged the
establishment of commissions with high degrees of autonomy and sufficient
powers to enforce common standards.
207
In the end, the dispute settlement panels were agreed to, although their
powers were limited. The Supplemental Agreements were signed by each of the
three national leaders on September 14, 1993.208 The new labor and environ-
mental commissions will be composed of the top labor ministers and environ-
mental officials of each country.209 A compromise has been worked out for
Canada, whereby dispute settlement panel judgments will be directly enforceable
in Canadian courts, obviating the need for trade sanctions against Canada.2'°
In addition to the conclusion of the side agreements, NAFTA may also lead
to strengthened environmental standards in Mexico through more indirect means.
The negotiations over NAFrA have already spurred increased cooperation
between the United States and Mexico in environmental enforcement.211
Economic growth stimulated by NAFrA may not only generate additional wealth
to be invested in environmental projects, but may also heighten the public
demand for a cleaner environment. NAFTA is also likely to lead to a greater
number of joint ventures between U.S. and Mexican companies, which could
203. NAFTA Negotiators Hit Roadblock Over Dispute Settlement Procedures, INT'L ENv'L REP. (BNA),
June 2, 1993 [hereinafter NAFTA Negotiators].
204. Id.
205. Mexican Official Sees No Job Loss Under NAFTA, DAILY LABOR REP. (BNA), June 16, 1993.
206. NAFTA Negotiators, supra note 203.
207. Id.
208. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Recruits 3 Presidents to Promote Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at B-i.
209. For the full text of these agreements, see 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1536-58 (1993).
210. See Summary Descriptions of NAFTA Supplemental Accords Issued by U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 1385-92 (1993).
211. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, The Transformation of Environmental Enforcement Cooperation Between
Mexico and the United States in the Wake of NAFTA, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 59 (1992); New
Methods Needed to Keep Pace with More Stringent Environmental Rules, INT'L ENV'L REP. (BNA), Apr. 7,
1993, at 260. In February 1992, EPA and its Mexican counterpart, the Secretariat of Social Development,
completed a comprehensive plan for addressing air, soil, water, and hazardous waste problems in the border
area. Agreement has been reached on measures to implement the first stage of the plan covering the period
1992 - 1994. The North American Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet, 5 U.S. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY,
Aug. 12, 1992, WESTLAW, Int'l Law, NAFrA.
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lead Mexican companies to adopt the higher environmental standards of their
U.S. joint venture partners. 2
C. Mexican Environmental Laws and Enforcement
In addition to the provisions of NAFTA itself and the possible efforts of the
commissions established by the NAFTA side agreements, American businesses
operating or investing in Mexico will need to be aware of domestic environmen-
tal legislation and regulations. Mexico already has a solid statutory and
regulatory structure in place for the protection of its environment. Mexico
enacted the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection (General Ecology Law or Law) in 1988, laying the cornerstone for all
future environmental regulation. The General Ecology Law outlines general
ecological policy with respect to environmental impact evaluation, hazardous
waste, air and water pollution, resource conservation, and enforcement, and
places the development of this policy within federal jurisdiction.2 ,3
The Mexican federal agency enforcing the General Ecology Law is the
Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL).214 Two separate agencies
under SEDESOL were established in June 1992 to handle the drafting and
enforcement of environmental regulations. The National Ecology Institute
(INEC) formulates and evaluates ecological policy and reviews environmental
impact statements. The Attorney General's Office for Environmental Protection
(PFPA) enforces the General Ecology Law and its regulations.
The Mexican government has enacted three major environmental regulations
pursuant to the General Ecology Law addressing environmental impact, air
pollution, and hazardous waste. Federal regulations that predate the Law
concerning water contamination and importation and exportation of hazardous
waste, also remain in force. In addition, all but two of Mexico's thirty-one
states, Campeche and Tlaxcala, have enacted local environmental laws.
President Salinas has made environmental issues an active priority, vowing
that "Mexico will not become a haven for companies seeking to evade other
nations' environmental laws., 215 The Salinas Administration has dramatically
increased Mexico's federal environmental budget from $6.6 million in 1989 to
212. Wesley R. Smith, Protecting the Environment in North America with Free Trade, HERITAGE FDN.
REP., Apr. 2, 1992; and Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 417-34 (1993).
213. United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor thus notes that "Mexico's environmental laws,
regulations, and standards are in many respects similar to those in the United States. Its comprehensive General
Ecology Law embodies principles similar to ours, and the regulations and technical standards implementing
this law take an approach comparable to ours." Kantor Testimony, supra note 200.
214. SEDESOL was established in 1992 and undertakes all responsibilities previously handled by the
former Secretariat of Ecology and Urban Development (SEDUE), which was established in 1983. Zamora,
supra note 212, at 421.
215. Kathleen Griffith, NAFTA, Sustainable Development, and the Environment: Mexico's Approach, 2
J. OF ENV'T. & DEV. 193, 194 (1993).
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over $77 million in 1992.216 Salinas has pledged to spend $4.6 billion to
control air pollution in Mexico City, mostly to increase the use of unleaded gas
and to install catalytic converters in automobiles.1 7 The Mexican government
has made $100 million available in credits for Mexican industries to purchase
and install anti-pollution equipment. Also a $1.6 billion revolving credit fund
was established in 1992 to help industries in Mexico City modernize and meet
stricter environmental standards. 8
Mexico has stepped up enforcement actions against industrial polluters,
including closing numerous plants and facilities.2" 9 The most dramatic action
was the 1991 order shutting down PEMEX's Azcapotzalco refinery in Mexico
City. Other actions include the 1992 "ecology pact" between government and
industry, which names 220 of the worst polluters in the Mexico City metropoli-
tan area and requires them to clean up or leave the city. The Mexican
government also has begun environmental audits of companies that SEDESOL
names as failing to comply with environmental regulations.
221
D. Effects of Environmental Enforcement on the Petroleum Industry
Strengthened enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico could have
significant implications for the petroleum industry. First, the shutdown of poorly
maintained refineries has already exacerbated Mexico's shortage of refining
capacity. Combined with Mexico's current push for the use of unleaded gasoline
in automobiles, this could lead to new opportunities for U.S. companies to join
with PEMEX in augmenting and expanding refining capacity.
Second, it is estimated that PEMEX will need to spend four to five billion
dollars for safety and environmental purposes alone, given the outcry to raise
environmental standards following the Guadalajara catastrophe. 222  PEMEX
will need substantial foreign investment and equipment to meet new, tougher
environmental standards. By one estimate, the Mexican energy market will need
$300 million worth of air and water pollution equipment by 1995.223 Ameri
can companies may well become the suppliers of much of this equipment.
Third, service stations in Mexico will also undergo extensive equipment
upgrading in response to environmental concerns. The Mexico Association of
Service Station Suppliers (Ampes) estimates that most of the equipment in
Mexico's approximately 3000 service stations is over ten years old and
216. Id. at 197.
217. Mexico Environmentalism: President Salinas Takes Unprecedented Action, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, June 13, 1993, at G-2.
218. Griffith, supra note 215, at 197.
219. Id. at 198.
220. Gray Newman, 'Ecology Pact' May Force Firms Out of Mexico City, 1992 Bus. LATIN AM. 97.
221. Industry Said to Face Many Problems in Conducting Environmental Audits of Units, INT'L ENV'L.
REP. (BNA), Mar. 24, 1993, at 225, 226.
222. Baird, supra note 30.
223. NAFTA's Energy Provisions Pave Way for U.S. Environmental, Energy Products, INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), June 16, 1993, at 988-89.
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desperately needs renovation.2' The President of Ampes, Eduardo Celorio,
has estimated that at least thirty percent of the storage tanks are leaking
gasoline.225 Most stations will need to be refitted with double walled storage
tanks and vapor recovery systems, which will cost over two billion dollars.226
PEMEX and Ampes have set up a credit union to provide station owners with
long term loans for refitting.227 American companies may find opportunities
in this area as well.
Fourth, U.S. companies planning to operate in Mexico will have to comply
with strong environmental laws and regulations. The most significant areas of
regulation are discussed below.
1. Environmental Impact Evaluation
Section V of The General Ecology Law provides specific requirements for
environmental impact evaluation, which apply to all activities that may affect
Mexico's ecological balance, including petrochemical production, activity on oil
and gas pipelines, and exploration, extraction, treatment, and refining of oil and
gas. All companies planning to engage in such activities must now apply for




Under the 1988 hazardous waste regulations, any company that
generates waste must determine whether it is hazardous by applying the
appropriate ecological technical standards issued by SEDESOL.229 Ecological
technical standard NTE-CRP-001/88, published June 6, 1988, established the
criteria for determining hazardous wastes and lists numerous wastes deemed to
be hazardous. Included on this list are exploration drilling muds, sediments from
the production of specified petrochemicals, and oily muds from crude oil
refining. A company that generates hazardous waste in its production processes
must register itself with the Registry of Hazardous Waste Generators, maintain
a monthly log of hazardous wastes generated, and handle all such waste in
accordance with the applicable regulations. Moreover, any hazardous wastes




228. Published in the Mexican Federal DIARIO OFICIAL (Nov. 25, 1988)(eff. Nov. 26, 1988).
229. The General Ecology Law defined ecological technical standards (NTEs) as those scientific or
technological rules issued by SEDESOL which established the requirements, specifications, conditions,
procedures, parameters, and permissible levels which must be observed in the engaging of activities or in the
use and destination of goods, which may cause ecological imbalances or harm to the environment. SEDESOL
has published several such standards related to hazardous waste, air pollution, and water contamination.
[Vol. 1:191
MEXICAN PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
generated from imported raw materials must be exported back to the country of
origin.'3
The importation and exportation of hazardous materials is regulated by the
Hazardous Materials Decree, in force since January 20, 1987. Hazardous
materials include pesticides and chemicals which either by themselves, in
combination with other substances, or as a result of improper handling, could
produce violent exothermic reactions or emit hazardous substances. Under the
Decree, a material may also be deemed to be hazardous based on its corrosive,
reactive, explosive, flammable, or toxic characteristics.
SEDESOL has not yet published a list of hazardous materials, so an
importer or exporter must determine whether the materials in question are subject
to regulation based on a list of characteristics outlined in a November 9, 1988
decree published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development.
Ecological waybills are required for the import or export of any such hazardous
material.
3. Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Any activity undertaken within Mexico or that affects the Mexican
environment is subject to Mexico's 1988 air pollution regulations.23' Under
these regulations, any company that emits odors, gases, and solid and liquid
particles from fixed or mobile sources is obligated to use air emissions
equipment and systems that ensure compliance with the applicable ecological
technical standards. If operating from a fixed source, the company must measure
and record its air polluting emissions and send this data to SEDESOL when
requested. Chapters Two and Three of the regulations provide additional
detailed provisions regarding air pollution control.
4. Water Pollution
The General Ecology Law provides that all water used in production
processes must receive proper treatment prior to discharge. 232  In order to
discharge such water, the producers must first file a Manifest for Water
Discharges with the Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources (SARH).
The Manifest should outline both the chemical components and/or organic
compounds contained in the water prior to its being treated, and the methods
used for treatment. Filing of the Manifest is mandatory even if the discharged
water is simply an incidental by-product of the actual production process.
230. In order to proceed with the exportation, the exporter must apply for an ecological waybill (gufa
ecol6gica) from SEDESOL. Ecological waybills authorize all importation, exportation, transport, and handling
of hazardous materials or waste, and must be obtained for every shipment.
231. Published in the Mexican Federal DIARIO OFICtAL, supra note 228.
232. In addition to the General Ecology Law, water resources are protected by the Regulations for the
Prevention and Control of Water Contamination, in full force since May 30, 1973.
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E. Mexican Labor Laws
Employment and labor in Mexico are governed by the Mexican Constitution
and by the Federal Labor Law (FLL), both of which are generally protective of
employee rights. The ratification of NAFTA with a strong side agreement on the
enforcement of labor standards would further enhance existing requirements with
which employers in Mexico would have to comply. As a first step, American
companies considering becoming employers in Mexico should familiarize
themselves with the basic protections afforded to workers under Mexican law.
1. Limitations on Hiring of Foreign Nationals
The FLL requires that at least ninety percent of an enterprise's workers be
Mexican nationals, with the exception of its directors, administrators, and general
managers. An employer may temporarily hire up to ten percent foreign
technicians and professionals if no similarly qualified Mexican nationals are
available.
Under a 1989 law, however, PEMEX is not subject to the traditional
requirement to use Mexican labor.233 Triton International became the first
operator to act on these relaxed labor requirements when it signed a 1991
contract with PEMEX to drill an exploratory well in the Gulf of Campeche.234
Although Triton's written contract with PEMEX was silent on the issue, PEMEX
indicated in a technical briefing to bidders that the successful bidder would have
full discretion with respect to the content of Mexican goods, services, and
personnel used under the contract, consistent with the 1989 law.235 Subsequent
drilling contracts between PEMEX and private companies (Mexican as well as
foreign) have also been free of the traditional requirement to hire Mexican
nationals.236
2. Severance Obligations
American employers will need to exercise particular caution in entering into
employment relationships with Mexican nationals. The FLL presumes a
permanent employment relationship if someone performs a job for another party
in consideration for payment, regardless of whether or not a written contract
exists. A temporary employment relationship must be spelled out in writing, and
is permitted only when the nature of the work so requires or when the purpose
of the employment is the temporary replacement of another worker. Under these
principles, an employer may ordinarily terminate an employment relationship
only for just cause as enumerated in the FLL, or by paying legal indemnities of
233. Tim Golden, Mexico Pries Open Its Oil Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at DI.
234. IdH
235. This observation is based on July 14, 1993 telephone conversations with a Triton International




three months' salary plus an additional twenty days of salary for each year of
services rendered.
3. Minimum Entitlements
The FLL establishes that an employee shall earn at least the minimum wage
set by the National Minimum Wage Commission.2 37 The maximum permitted
work schedule is eight hours per day, six days per week. For each six days of
work, employees are entitled to one day of rest with full pay. A statutory
overtime rate of 200% applies for the first nine hours worked over the forty-
eight-hour maximum, and a statutory rate of 300% applies for all overtime in
excess of nine hours. Employees also receive a twenty-four percent premium for
work on Sundays.
The FLL grants seven paid holidays each year, plus one for Inauguration
Day every sixth year. Employees are also entitled to vacation days according to
a fixed schedule based on seniority. An annual Christmas bonus of at least
fifteen days' salary is obligatory and must be paid by December 20 of each year.
The FLL also mandates profit-sharing under which employers must distribute ten
percent of their pretax profits to their employees.
4. Health and Safety
Employees are entitled to a safe and sanitary workplace. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Welfare has issued several instructives regulating occupational
health and safety covering a wide variety of workplace situations. These include
the handling of flammable and combustible substances; 238 storing, transporting,
and handling corrosive, irritant, and toxic substances; 239 and regulation of
workplaces where chemical substances are produced, stored, or handted
4°
5. Social Security
The Social Security Law requires both employers and employees to register
with the Mexican Social Security Institute. Registration relieves the employer
of liability for job-related illnesses or accidents, and provides benefits to
employees and their dependents, including medical and hospitalization insurance,
insurance for disability, old age, unemployment and death, and child care.
237. The National Minimum Wage Commission sets wages for each of three different economic zones in
Mexico. The current minimum wage in Zone A, which includes Mexico City, is N $14.27 per day, or U.S.
$4.65 per day. It would be misleading, however, to use this figure as an estimate of employee compensation
costs. A 1992 survey of subsidiaries of foreign manufacturing companies by BVS. LATIN AM. found average
worker compensation to be as much as five times the minimum wage. Gray Newman & Vicky Cowal, Low
Wage Rates in Mexico Mask Hidden Costs in Labor Compensation, 1992 Bus. LATIN AM. 134. In addition,
benefits can add another 40-80% to labor costs, and the mandatory profit-sharing program will add at least
another 10%. Id.
238. Instructive No. 5 (Mar. 28, 1993).
239. Instructive No. 9 (Mar. 28, 1993).
240. Instructive No. 10 (May 28, 1984).
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6. Right to Unionize and Strike
The Mexican Constitution guarantees employees the right to form unions
and protects them from anti-union discrimination by employers. The right to
strike is also constitutionally protected.
V CONCLUSION: NEXT STEPS FOR U.S. COMPANIES
For the petroleum industry, NAFTA undoubtedly constitutes a momentary
disappointment. Mexico's staunch support of its Constitution and refusal to
develop creative ways to honor its legal system while giving its petroleum sector
(and accordingly, its general economy) a much needed boost is viewed by some
as short-sighted and short-term. Whether the Mexican petroleum sector can step
into the future on the basis of its past performance and current direction without
the benefit of the knowledge, capability, and technology of the foreign petroleum
industry remains an open question. The reaction of the U.S. petroleum industry
to Mexico's insistence on PEMEX's general monopoly will depend, in part, on
the opportunities that are available to the U.S. industry in other parts of the
world and on its willingness to be patient while Mexico feels its way through an
Agreement that is likely to change the way it does business in every sector of
its economy.
In the meantime, NAFTA has opened the door to Mexico's petroleum
industry at least a crack, which will allow U.S. business interests to become
involved in this industry to varying degrees, depending on the willingness of
U.S. industry leaders to settle for less now, with the promise of more later. For
the service and supply sector, the opportunities are the most promising and
current. For exploration and production companies, a more wait-and-see
approach is required, although some integrated U.S. companies are already
becoming involved in the downstream sector in an effort to position themselves
for opportunities that will soon become available upstream. Natural gas
producers seeking to export are well positioned to increase sales to Mexico,
particularly along the border areas, at least so long as Mexico's demand
continues to outstrip its domestic production and delivery capability. Opportuni-
ties in marketing and refining remain blocked, although these sectors may also
become open to limited participation by U.S. entities.
In addition, the over-arching effects of a more environmentally conscious
population will have a wide-ranging effect on all aspects of the petroleum
industry. The most obvious manifestations include already apparent needs for
cleaner gasolines for domestic consumption, new requirements for natural gas for
industrial use, the prospect of joint ventures between PEMEX and U.S.
petroleum companies in order to provide refined products to the Mexican market,
a demand for sophisticated pollution cleanup technology, and the basic upgrading
of service stations that U.S. operators have seen in recent years. The changes
inspired in other sectors of the economy by American business interests will
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influence Mexico's willingness to reconsider its position with respect to its grip
on the petroleum industry.
Interested U.S. energy companies can take a number of steps to position
themselves to take advantage of NAFTA's immediate benefits and those likely
to evolve in the future. In particular, the following courses of action are
recommended:
1. Evaluate the Impacts.
Any company that has an interest in expanding its markets into Mexico
should evaluate the Agreement to assess its probable impact on the company's
business. For instance, oilfield equipment companies should analyze the tariff
schedules to assess the time frame over which tariffs on their equipment is being
reduced. These companies should also evaluate the origin of their equipment to
determine whether the equipment will qualify for unrestricted trade under the
rules of origin established by the Agreement.
2. Become Familiar With The Procurement Process.
It is in the best interests of every U.S. oil and gas company to begin a
dialogue with PEMEX, formal or informal, since PEMEX remains at the center
of the Mexican petroleum industry, even after NAFTA. In particular, it would
be beneficial for any company intending to bid in future government procure-
ment to understand the specifications normally utilized by PEMEX, with an eye
to determining whether their supplies or services meet those specifications, or to
suggest the development of more appropriate specifications. PEMEX require-
ments are often very exacting in terms of documentation, and the bidder is
frequently required to notarize and legalize a large number of attachments. In
some cases, it may also be useful to review previous bids and associated
specifications to obtain a better understanding of the process and requirements.
3. Become Involved in Local Business Activity.
Since prior business activity in the Mexican energy industry will remain a
legitimate consideration in the qualification process, companies interested in
enhancing their chances for the award of tendered contracts should seek out
opportunities to establish a track record in Mexico.
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